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THE WEALTH TAX: APPORTIONMENT, FEDERALISM, AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY
ALEX ZHANG*
Proposals of wealth taxation—as a mechanism to combat economic inequality and raise
revenue for welfare programs—have dominated recent political debate. Despite extensive
academic commentary, questions surrounding the constitutionality of a wealth tax remain
unresolved. Previous scholarly approaches have drawn a dichotomy between two key cases.
Supporters of the wealth tax emphasize Hylton’s functional rule for identifying direct taxes, which
must be apportioned under the Constitution, and reject Pollock, which invalidated the federal
income tax on the grounds that it was a direct tax. Opponents of the wealth tax, in contrast, argue
that Pollock, rather than Hylton, was correctly decided.
This Article examines the inequitable results of apportioning the wealth tax and argues
that both Hylton’s rule of reason and the underlying, federalism rationale of Pollock disfavor
classifying the wealth tax as a direct tax. Using IRS personal-wealth data, I estimate the wealth
tax rates as apportioned in accordance with the geographic distribution of wealth among the
states. The disparate impact of apportionment—imposing tax rates ranging from 2% in D.C. to
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INTRODUCTION
Issues of taxation and economic inequality have dominated much of the debate in the
2020 Democratic presidential primaries. Concerned with increasingly concentrated wealth and the
resultant emergence of a “democracy-distorting” oligarchy,1 and criticizing the 2017 Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (TCJA)2 as a giveaway to the rich,3 Democratic politicians have offered various policy
platforms to instantiate their sense of distributive justice. Among the most prominent—and
perhaps the most controversial—are proposals to tax wealth, especially that of ultra-high-net-
worth households. The proposed schemes of wealth taxation are not complex: for example,
Senator Elizabeth Warren’s plan—the “Ultra-Millionaire Tax”—involves imposing a 2% annual
tax on household net worth above $50 million and a 4% annual Billionaire surtax (i.e., a 6%
overall tax) on household net worth above $1 billion.4 Senator Bernie Sanders’s plan specifies a
more graduated scale of tax rates, ranging from a 2% tax on net worth above $32 million to an 8%
tax on net worth above $10 billion.5 Implementation of wealth taxation, according to its
advocates, will dilute the fortune of the top 1%, which holds roughly the same amount of wealth
as the bottom 90%.6 Revenue raised from taxing wealth—with the most optimistic estimates
coming in at $3.75 trillion for the next decade—can pay for ambitious welfare programs, such as
Medicare for All.7 Even President Donald Trump, during his unsuccessful bid for the Reform
1 See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Elizabeth Warren Wants a Wealth Tax. How Would That Even Work?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/upshot/warren-wealth-tax.html [https://perma.cc/5BLE-KZ35]
(explaining that for wealth-tax advocates, “accumulation of untaxed or lightly taxed wealth . . . enables the creation of
democracy-distorting dynasties who accumulate political power”); see also Senator Warren Unveils Proposal to Tax
Wealth of Ultra-Rich Americans, OFF. SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-unveils-proposal-to-tax-wealth-of-ultra-rich-americans [https://perma.cc/YM2S-
B9CY] (“For decades, a small group of families has raked in a massive amount of the wealth American workers have
produced, while America’s middle class has been hollowed out. The result is an extreme concentration of wealth not seen
in any other leading economy”); Letter from Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Professors of Economics, University of
California at Berkeley, to Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator 4 (Jan. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Wealth Tax Estimates Letter],
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/saez-zucman-wealthtax.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9PU-JWBY] (noting that a
“key motivation” for progressive wealth taxation is to “curb the growing concentration of wealth”); Matthew Smith, Owen
Zidar & Eric Zwick, Top Wealth in the United States: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich 1 (July 19,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://ericzwick.com/wealth/wealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW9A-29Y3] (concluding that
“[o]verall, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds as much wealth as the bottom 90%”).
2 An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3 Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate in 51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/politics/tax-bill-vote-congress.html [https://perma.cc/3CF6-FWQF]
(citing Representative Nancy Pelosi’s quote describing the 2017 tax legislation as “simply theft—monumental, brazen
theft from the American middle class and from every person who aspires to reach it”).
4 Ultra-Millionaire Tax, ELIZABETH WARREN (Nov. 1, 2019), https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-
millionaire-tax [https://perma.cc/4C3H-5JBV].
5 Tax on Extreme Wealth, BERNIE SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/issues/tax-extreme-wealth
[https://perma.cc/H86B-F7BG].
6 See Ultra-Millionaire Tax, supra note 4; see also Wealth Tax Estimates Letter, supra note 1, at 4; Smith,
Zidar & Zwick, supra note 1, at 3.
7 See Joshua Jamerson et al., Warren Would Tax the Wealthy, Companies to Pay for Medicare for All,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss4/1
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Party’s nomination in the 2000 presidential election, proposed imposing a one-time 14.25% tax on
individuals and trusts with net worth above $10 million in order to pay off the national debt.8
The idea of wealth taxation has provoked vigorous criticism, ranging from concerns
about its revenue-raising potential to administrability issues such as valuation and liquidity.9 In
addition to these routine critiques, opponents have also launched attacks on the constitutionality of
the wealth tax, since it is assessed on the basis of net worth rather than on the basis of income.
One prominent scholar, Jonathan Turley, has argued that Elizabeth Warren’s proposed regime of
wealth tax is “probably unconstitutional” based on an examination of constitutional “text, history
and precedent.”10 Professor Turley’s argument relies heavily on his reading of Hylton v. United
States11 and Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.12 According to Turley, the former implicitly
endorsed Alexander Hamilton’s definition of a direct tax (“capitation or poll taxes, and taxes on
lands and buildings, and general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals or on
their whole real or personal estate”),13 and the latter then reaffirmed Hylton’s prohibition in
striking down the federal income tax.14 In response, Bruce Ackerman has argued that Pollock was
a historical and jurisprudential anomaly.15 Relying on Hylton’s rule of reason (that the “rule of
apportionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can reasonably apply”),16 Professor
WALL STREET J. (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/warren-to-tax-wealthy-americans-companies-to-pay-for-
medicare-for-all-11572614846 [https://perma.cc/YE5R-3HHK].
8 Adam Nagourney, Trump Proposes Clearing Nation’s Debt at Expense of the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10,
1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/10/us/trump-proposes-clearing-nation-s-debt-at-expense-of-the-rich.html
[https://perma.cc/5E7W-JJR3].
9 For example, Lawrence Summers and Natasha Sarin have estimated (based on Warren’s previously
proposed tax rates of 2% on net worth above $50 million, and 3% on net worth above $1 billion) that the wealth tax would
raise only $25 billion per year, compared to Saez and Zucman’s estimate of $212 billion per year. Summers & Sarin’s
estimate is based on existing IRS estate-tax data and criticizes Saez & Zucman for being “overly optimistic” and ignoring
“the myriad ways wealthy people avoid paying estate taxes” that would apply to wealth taxes as well. These abuses
include “questionable appraisals; valuation discounts for illiquidity and lack of control; establishment of trusts . . . [and]
tax-advantaged lending schemes.” See Lawrence H. Summers & Natasha Sarin, A ‘Wealth Tax’ Presents a Revenue
Estimation Puzzle, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/04/wealth-tax-
presents-revenue-estimation-puzzle [https://perma.cc/L678-3689]; see also David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A
Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499, 526-31 (2000) (surveying the various administrability issues of a wealth
tax, including collection and valuation problems); James R. Repetti, It’s All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607, 607
(arguing that the annual valuation requirement would “erode the tax base” and “make the wealth tax unmanageable,”
because taxpayers will be incentivized to minimize the value of their property and their tax burden).
10 Jonathan Turley, Elizabeth Warren’s Popular Plan to Tax the Rich Is Probably Unconstitutional, WASH.
POST (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/elizabeth-warrens-popular-plan-to-tax-the-rich-is-
probably-unconstitutional/2019/02/14/60195bc4-2fec-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html [https://perma.cc/GLK8-
BQGF].
11 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796).
12 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
13 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 598 (1881).
14 See Turley, supra note 10.
15 Bruce Ackerman, The Constitutional Critiques of Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax Plan Are Absurd,
SLATE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/elizabeth-warren-2020-wealth-tax-constitutional.html
[https://perma.cc/AQ5B-YEZG].
16 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174.
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Ackerman contends that any principled jurist should uphold the wealth tax based on the original
understandings of the Direct Tax Clause and of the Sixteenth Amendment.17 This recent debate on
popular media reflects a deeper, longstanding disagreement over the scope and application of the
Direct Tax Clause.18
Missing from recent discussions is an empirical analysis of how exactly the wealth tax
would be apportioned and, relatedly, the recognition that even in Pollock, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Direct Tax Clause as a federalism provision whose purpose is to preserve the
ability of state and local governments to tax.19 Supporters of the wealth tax have generally
followed the path of Professor Ackerman and brushed Pollock aside as an infamous decision of
the Lockner era.20 Although this view may theoretically be correct, the contemporary Supreme
Court has signaled that it disagrees. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,21
Justice Roberts—likely to be the swing vote if the wealth tax is enacted and litigated22—indicated
that Pollock’s holding that taxes on personal property are direct taxes is still good law, even
though its invalidation of the federal income tax has been overruled by the Sixteenth
Amendment.23 Any successful litigation strategy, therefore, must reconcile the wealth tax with
Pollock, or at the very least take Pollock into account, articulating a theory about why a tax on net
worth, which clearly constitute personal property, should not be a direct tax.
This Article argues that both Hylton’s rule of reason and the underlying rationale of
Pollock disfavor classifying the wealth tax as a direct tax once we see the “great inequality and
injustice”24 that would result from apportioning the wealth tax. This Article proceeds as follows:
Part I describes the doctrinal framework surrounding the Direct Tax Clause. Part II briefly
examines previous scholarship about the constitutionality of wealth taxation. Part III analyzes
how the wealth tax would be apportioned based on IRS data on personal wealth distribution,
17 Ackerman, supra note 15.
18 See infra Part II.
19 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 620-22 (1895) (explaining the “reasons for the
clauses of the Constitution in respect of direct taxation”).
20 See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax, 93 IND. L.J.
111, 127 (2018) (noting “the shocking deficiencies in the majority’s analysis in Pollock” and its “remarkable lapse in
judicial craft,” while comparing Pollock to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the
Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 298 (2004) (“Pollock was
wrongly decided at the time . . . [and] [i]t is time now to overrule Pollock in full and to return to Hylton.”); Letter from
Bruce Ackerman, Anne Alstott, Philip Bobbitt, et al., Professors of Law, to Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator (Jan. 24,
2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Constitutionality%20Letters.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LSG-255H].
21 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
22 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Wealth Tax’s Legality Depends on What ‘Direct’ Means, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-30/elizabeth-warren-s-wealth-tax-is-probably-constitutional
[https://perma.cc/6SKN-RHCM] (“The decision would likely come down to Roberts’s vote—like so many other unsettled
questions in today’s constitutional law.”).
23 See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 571 (explaining that Pollock’s invalidation of the federal income tax “was
overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes”
(citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218-19 (1920))); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress the
“power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration”).
24 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174.
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arguing that apportionment would run counter to both Hylton and Pollock’s conception of the
Direct Tax Clause as a federalism provision. The conclusion provides suggestions about how a
potential wealth tax should be drafted.
I. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
A. “Direct Taxes” in the Constitution
The term “direct tax” appears twice in the Constitution. Article I, Section 2, which
defines the composition of the House, commands that “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers.”25 This clause
also effectuates the infamous Three-Fifths Compromise, but while the Fourteenth Amendment has
explicitly repealed the three-fifths ratio in determining representation in the House,26 the
apportionment requirement itself remains intact. Indeed, Article I, Section 9, which enumerates
specific limitations on congressional authority, prohibits any unapportioned direct taxation by the
federal government: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”27
The text of the Constitution yields only three main implications. It merely confirms that
poll or capitation taxes, imposed on individual taxpayers at fixed rates that do not vary on the
basis of income, wealth, or consumption, constitute direct taxes. In addition, it suggests that there
exist other types of direct taxes that are not capitation taxes, without specifying exactly what they
are or how to identify them. Lastly, the constitutional text and structure implies that “duties,
imposts, and excises” cannot be direct taxes. This is because Article I, Section 8 requires that “all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”28 The requirement of
uniformity is irreconcilable with the requirement of apportionment: as long as the distribution of
population among the states differs from the distribution of the tax base, apportionment of the
direct tax will result in differential (i.e., non-uniform) tax rates from state to state. But again, this
implication only gives us three examples of what direct taxes are not, instead of any firm guidance
what they are. Even from the founding era, it was often unclear what exactly a direct tax was.
During the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Rufus King of Massachusetts famously asked what a
direct tax was, and according to James Madison’s notes, no one answered.29 Due to the dearth of
textual evidence and the inconclusiveness of historical records, scholars have long concluded that
the meaning of direct taxes was unsettled during the Philadelphia Convention, or at least that there
was no consensus behind one single definition of direct taxes.30
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”).
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
29 See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 640.
30 See, e.g., J.H. Riddle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of a Direct Tax, 15 MICH. L. REV. 566, 566 (1917)
(concluding that “the authoritative opinion of those who have examined the records is that there was no definite meaning
agreed upon in the Convention and that [“direct tax”] was a vague term,” and quoting another scholar as stating that “no
one knew exactly what was meant by a direct tax, because no two people agreed.” (quoting E.R.A. Seligman, THE INCOME
TAX 569 (1914))).
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In the wake of the Court’s (perhaps unexpected) decision to uphold the individual
mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power in Sebelius, some scholars have argued
that the term “direct tax” had a plain and clear meaning during the Founding Era. After an
examination of the text of the Constitution and political and legislative materials from the 1780s,
Professor Natelson concludes that “the distinction between direct and indirect taxes was widely
understood during the Founding Era and that the term ‘direct tax’ was more expansive than
commonly realized.”31 But—without providing a full critique that is beyond the scope of the
present Article—this conclusion is problematic in at least two ways. First, Professor Natelson’s
argument depends heavily on historical materials produced outside of the context of the
Philadelphia Convention, including from the Anti-Federalist,32 when it is a cardinal rule of
interpretation not to rely on loser’s legislative history as authoritative or outcome-determinative.33
It is also possible that specific actors outside of the Convention had a clear understanding of the
meaning of direct taxes when there was no majority supporting a single definition at the
Convention. Second, much of the same evidence on which Professor Natelson relies for a broad
Founding-Era conception of direct taxes—for example, John Marshall’s statement that direct
taxes included lands, stock, and business capital,34 or a Pennsylvania land tax that included levies
not only on land but also on livestock and indentured servants35—may also support a narrow
Founding-Era conception of direct taxes. For Professor Ackerman has shown that the
Physiocrats—some of the leading economic thinkers of the eighteenth century—articulated an
influential distinction between direct taxation (on land and agricultural production) and indirect
taxation (on surplus value derived from agriculture) based on their belief that only agriculture
generated wealth.36 An ostensibly “broad” conception of direct taxes that includes any levy on
land, livestock, and business capital can, therefore, also be framed as a “narrow” conception of
direct taxes that includes only levies on the (relatively small) agricultural sector.37 All of this
suggests the absence of a settled conception of direct taxes during the Founding Era—the core
meaning of the term (capitation taxes) may have been undisputed, but the peripheries were not
clearly defined.
31 See Robert G. Natelson, What the Constitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and “Taxes”
(Direct or Otherwise), 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 297 (2015). The normative and doctrinal upshot of this originalist
analysis is that the individual mandate—if indeed a tax rather than an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power—is
a direct tax and must be apportioned among the states. See id. at 343-50.
32 See id. at 309-10.
33 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 236-37 (2016) (describing the sore loser’s canon of interpretation); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory
of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 118-28 (2012) (analogizing reliance on
legislative history from the loser’s side to confusing a judicial dissent for a majority opinion).
34 Natelson, supra note 31, at 309.
35 Id. at 312.
36 See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1999).
37 See also Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the
Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 855 (2009) (arguing that “direct taxes” cannot seriously be characterized as
anything beyond a property tax, and that “[a]n expansive view of apportionment is either not supported by, or is contrary
to, the full range of approaches to constitutional interpretation: textualism, Framers’ intent, contemporaneous
understanding, doctrine, functionalism, and policy”).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss4/1
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B. Hylton’s Functional Rule
The Supreme Court encountered precisely this question in Hylton in 1796, which
concerned Congress’s imposition of a tax on carriages (with graduated rates based on the type of
carriage, e.g., chariots, coaches, and two-wheeled vehicles).38 Without reaching a precise
definition of direct taxes, Hylton announced a broad functional rule: “If it is proposed to tax any
specific article by the rule of apportionment, and it would evidently create great inequality and
injustice, it is unreasonable to say, that the Constitution intended such tax should be laid by that
rule.”39 In other words, if apportionment of any tax would lead to unjust or inequitable results, that
tax is absolved of any constitutional requirement to be apportioned. Justice Chase illustrates this
principle with a hypothetical:
Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 dollars each, by a tax on
carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; and in one State there are 100
carriages, and in the other 1000. The owners of carriages in one State, would
pay ten times the tax of owners in the other. A. in one State, would pay for his
carriage 8 dollars, but B. in the other state, would pay for his carriage, 80
dollars.40
Although the example’s algebra is somewhat questionable,41 the basic logic stands: if
apportionment of a tax results in taxpayers in one state paying vastly more than similarly situated
taxpayers in another state (for example, ten times as much), the tax is not a direct tax and needs
not be apportioned. Framers, according to the Court, could not have intended such horizontal
inequity: it was simply unthinkable that a taxpayer in South Carolina should be subject to a $100
tax burden for possessing the exact same type of coach carriage as a Pennsylvania taxpayer who
pays $10 in taxes.
It is worthwhile to note the distinctive functional or equitable approach employed by
Hylton. Broadly speaking, there are two main ways of identifying a direct tax: the court may look
to the nature of the tax—i.e., on what base is the tax imposed?—or the court may look to the
consequences of the chosen method of taxation—i.e., what results does apportioning the tax
according to each state’s population produce? In Hylton, the Court certainly could have decided
the case using the former approach, by characterizing the carriage tax as a duty or excise tax that
must be imposed at uniform rates throughout the country. In fact, this was precisely the
government’s argument at the Circuit Court, where it contended that direct taxes are those
imposed on “the revenue and or income of individuals,” whereas indirect taxes are those imposed
on “their expenses, or consumption.”42 Taxes on carriages, John Wickham (the government’s
38 Beyond its importance as a precedent for the meaning of “direct taxes” in the Constitution, Hylton also
provides one of the earliest examples of judicial review of a congressional statute—the Carriage Tax Act of 1794, enacted
to raise funds in anticipation of possible military confrontations with England. See Robert P. Frankel, Before Marbury:
Hylton v. United States and the Origins of Judicial Review, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1 (2008).
39 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174.
40 Id.
41 It seems that, in order to raise $80,000 on 100 or 1000 carriages, the tax would have to be $800 or $80,
respectively, not $80 or $8 as Justice Chase states.
42 7 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 363
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lawyer) argued, were indirect because they were not imposed on income or income-generating
property but on consumption goods that represent a depletion rather a potential increase in future
revenue streams.43 The functional rule announced in Hylton, however, does not adopt this
approach or regard the nature of the tax base as dispositive in determining the direct/indirect status
of a federal tax. The outcome-determinative question is whether—and perhaps to what extent—
apportioning the tax according to state populations results in unjust or inequitable treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers.
C. Pollock: Reading the Direct Tax Clause as a Federalism Provision
Roughly a century later, the Supreme Court retreated from the functional rule of Hylton
and held, in Pollock, that taxes on real estate and personal property, as well as taxes on rents from
real estate and on income from personal property, are direct taxes that must be apportioned among
the states.44 Income and rents were, of course, unevenly distributed in 1895,45 just as carriages
were unevenly distributed in 1796. The Court, however, declined to extend Hylton’s rule: despite
the manifest inequality and injustice that would result from apportioning the income tax, Pollock
held it to be a direct tax. Although Pollock’s invalidation of the income tax was in effect overruled
by the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorized Congress to tax income from whatever source
derived,46 its holding that tax on personal property is a direct tax has persisted. In Sebelius, in
declining to characterize Affordable Care Act’s health insurance penalty as a direct tax, the Court
explained that it “continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes,” citing
Eisner v. Macomber, a case decided after the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment.47 The
Sebelius Court then reasoned that, since the ACA health insurance penalty was neither a capitation
tax nor “a tax on the ownership of land or personal property,” it was not a direct tax and did not
need to be apportioned.48 If the Court stands by its reading of Pollock as holding that taxes on
personal property are direct (as it did in Sebelius), then a national wealth tax would seem to be
unconstitutional, as wealth is clearly personal property, and at least part of the wealth held by
high-net-worth households is in the form of land.
(Maeva Marcus ed., 2003).
43 Curiously, with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, this dichotomy has completely flipped: income
taxation is now constitutionally authorized without any need for apportionment, while the Supreme Court has
unequivocally declared in Sebelius that it continues to regard taxes on personal property (e.g., for consumption) as direct
taxes. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012) (citing Eisner, 252 U.S. at
218-19).
44 Pollock, 158 U.S. 601.
45 A recent study, for example, estimates that North Carolina had a per capita income of $60 in 1890,
compared to $449 for Montana. See Alexander Klein, Personal Income of U.S. States: Estimates for the Period 1880-1910,
WARWICK U. ECON. RES. PAPERS 56 (Sept. 2009), https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2009/
twerp_916.pdf [https://perma.cc/D89E-DSHZ].
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. It is worthwhile to note that the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment is
limited to income taxation.
47 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 571 (citing Eisner, 252 U.S. at 218-19) (holding that a stock dividend without
distribution of profits is not “income” within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, and that any taxation of stock
dividends must be apportioned among the states).
48 Id.
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But such a simplistic reading of Pollock ignores the underlying rationale of the decision.
Recent discussions emphasize that Pollock was controversial in its time, generating a 5-4 vote and
four vigorous dissents, and was a manifestation of the Lochner-era anachronism of economic
substantive due process.49 This view obscures the fact that Pollock also reflects a deep,
jurisprudential debate about the meaning and the purpose of the Direct Tax Clause. In his dissent,
Justice Harlan castigated the majority for reviving a product of the slavery compromise: the
majority “so interprets constitutional provisions, originally designed to protect the slave property
against oppressive taxation, as to give privileges and immunities never contemplated by the
founders of the government.”50 According to Justice Harlan, then, the original intent of the
Framers in enacting the Direct Tax Clause was to prevent Congress from “tax[ing] slaves, at
discretion or arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union after the same rate or measure.”51 The
majority in Pollock, however, abused this provision to grant ordinary citizens the immunity from
federal income taxation. Also in dissent, Justice Brown agreed with this assessment, commenting
that the “rule of apportionment was adopted for a special and temporary purpose, that passed
away with the existence of slavery.”52 Such an interpretation of the Direct Tax Clause originates
from Hylton, where Justice Paterson, in a seriatim opinion, made the following observations,
worth quoting in full:
[The Southern states] possessed a large number of slaves; they had extensive
tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive. A majority of the
states had but few slaves, and several of them a limited territory, well settled,
and in a high state of cultivation. The southern states, if no provision had been
introduced in the Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the
other states. Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily,
and land in every part of the Union after the same rate or measure: so much a
head in the first instance, and so much an acre in the second. To guard them
against imposition in these particulars, was the reason of introducing the clause
in the Constitution, which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be
apportioned among the states, according to their respective numbers.53
According to Justice Paterson—who himself attended the 1787 Philadelphia Convention,
proposed the New Jersey Plan, and signed the Constitution—the purpose of the Direct Tax Clause
was to prohibit unapportioned federal taxation on slaves and land. Since the Southern states had
an abundance of slaves and relatively under-populated (and therefore comparatively
unproductive) land, the Constitution protected them against direct taxation that, even framed in
neutral terms (e.g., $1 per acre of privately owned land, or $1 per slave), would have disparate
impact across the states. In arguing that the majority impermissibly expanded the scope of the
Direct Tax Clause, Justices Harlan and Brown in Pollock both emphasized the slavery-protecting
49 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 36, at 39-43 (grouping Pollock with the Child Labor Tax Case under the
“Age of Lochner”); Johnsen & Dellinger, supra note 20, at 114, 135 (“Pollock stands, along with other Lochner-era
decisions, as a quintessential example of the Court grossly exceeding its authority on a matter of extreme importance.”).
50 Pollock, 158 U.S. 601, 684 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 645 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 687 (Brown, J., dissenting).
53 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 177.
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aspect this provision.
But if we scrutinize Justice Paterson’s words, it becomes less clear that the Direct Tax
Clause aims solely to protect slavery. After all, the Clause also protected Southern states (or more
generally, the states that are less densely populated than the national average) against
unapportioned federal taxation of land. In particular, it is difficult to determine the level of
generality with which to view the Direct Tax Clause: (1) At the most specific and selective level,
we may interpret it as a product of the slavery compromise, which obviously has and should have
no application today;54 (2) We may also interpret it as a specific proscription of unapportioned
federal taxation of land and slaves only; (3) At the most general level, however, we interpret the
Direct Tax Clause as a federalism provision, one that prevents the federal government from
enacting any scheme of taxation that, because of its disparate impact across the states, would
destroy the ability of the several states to tax on their own. The majority in Pollock adopted
exactly the third possibility and interpreted the Direct Tax Clause at the highest level of
generality:
The states, respectively, possessed plenary powers of taxation. They could tax
the property of their citizens in such manner and to such extent as they saw
fit. . . . [In ratifying the Constitution, t]hey retained the power of direct taxation,
and to that they looked as their chief resource. . . . Therefore they did not grant
the power of direct taxation without regard to their own condition and resources
as states, but they granted the power of apportioned direct taxation. . . .55
Although I do not necessarily agree with the Pollock majority’s characterization of the
Direct Tax Clause, it is not unreasonable. Under the Articles of Confederation, the national
government had no independent taxing power but relied on the states and foreign loans to sustain
its operations. An intense object of debate leading up to the ratification of the Constitution,
therefore, concerned the broad taxing power granted to the national government under Article I,56
and, more precisely, whether state and local governments could continue to raise revenue after the
federal government chose to exercise its taxing power.57 After the Civil War, constitutional
amendments repealed many of the pro-slavery provisions (e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment
repealed the Three-Fifths Clause),58 but the Direct Tax Clause was left intact. For a textualist-
54 See Ackerman, supra note 36.
55 Pollock, 158 U.S. at 620-21.
56 See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises.”).
57 Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing and rejecting as speculative the fear
that “all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and
destruction of the State governments”) with THE ANTI-FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Brutus) (observing that if taxpayers cannot
afford to pay a federal tax and a state tax, they would forgo paying the state tax because of the Supremacy Clause, with the
result that “the respective state governments will not have the power to raise one shilling in any way, but by the permission
of the Congress”).
58 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States . . . including . . . three fifths of all other Persons.”) with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“Representatives shall be
apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed.”).
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originalist court, since the Direct Tax Clause remains in the constitutional text, and since the Civil
War ended the institution of slavery, a ready option is to interpret the Clause at a high level of
generality. Read as a provision of federalism, the Direct Tax Clause is meant to preserve the
taxing capacities of state and local governments, so that they can exercise their traditional taxing
power concurrently with the federal government, and consequently spend in accordance with local
priorities and preferences.
Therefore, at least with respect to wealth taxation, we can easily reconcile the underlying
rationale of Pollock with the functional rule of Hylton. If apportionment of a direct tax would
produce, in Hylton’s words, “great inequality and injustice” among the states,59 it would
necessarily impair the ability of some states to tax (though perhaps rewarding other states with
increased ability to tax).60 To use the example that Justice Chase offered in Hylton: if the carriage
tax is apportioned among the states, and state A faces an $80 tax per carriage while state B faces
an $8 tax per carriage, the apportionment would clearly impair state A’s taxing capacity. An
apportioned wealth tax would be even more detrimental to the ability of certain state and local
governments to tax, for two reasons: first, wealth includes a much broader set of personal
properties than carriages, so an apportioned wealth tax would more completely destroy the ability
of certain (i.e., poor) states to tax—not only would the state be unable to tax carriages, it would
also find other property taxes hard to collect; second, wealth, unlike ordinary consumer goods, is
more unevenly distributed, especially for households with net worths above $50 million—New
York likely has many more ultra-millionaires than West Virginia, even after adjusting for
differences in population.61 The upshot is that the functional rule of Hylton concerns the unfair
consequences of apportioning a direct tax not only to the taxpayers but also to the states and
localities that rely on at least some inter-jurisdictional equity in the distribution of federal tax
burdens. In short, both equitable treatment of similarly situated individual taxpayers and
federalism animate the functional rule.
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This Part of the Article briefly reviews previous scholarship on direct and wealth
taxation. The most authoritative treatment of the Direct Tax Clause is Bruce Ackerman’s 1999
article, Taxation and the Constitution, which argues that the provision should “rest in peace.”62
Emphasizing the “tainted origins of the direct tax clauses,” Professor Ackerman describes them as
parts of the slavery compromise during the Constitutional Convention, a setup for the sake of
political expedience rather than independent judgment about designing a tax system.63 As a result,
the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the Direct Tax Clause, making sure not to expand the
scope of a bargained-for exception to Congress’s broad taxing power.64 This treatment, of course,
59 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174.
60 For example, should Congress enact an apportioned national wealth tax—which would definitely survive
a constitutional challenge under the Direct Tax Clause—and use it to finance federal spending, Utah residents may face a
wealth tax rate of 15% while New York residents may face one of 4%. See infra Section III.A. States that bear a lighter
federal tax burden can then preserve more of their tax base for state and local taxation.
61 See also Part III.
62 Ackerman, supra note 36, at 3.
63 Id. at 4.
64 Id. at 4, 20-28.
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accords with the general rule that exceptions must be narrowly interpreted.65 An act of judicial
activism that radically departed from precedents, Pollock was incorrectly decided at the time and
remains, deservedly, a “dead letter,” as subsequent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate.66 Since
the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments effectively overruled the slavery compromise,
the direct tax provisions should have no place in today’s constitutional jurisprudence. National tax
policy, Professor Ackerman contends, should be crafted with an eye toward distributive justice,
without any regard for issues of constitutionality.67
Recent scholarship has generally followed this path. In an article directly addressing the
constitutionality of a wealth tax, Professors Johnsen and Dellinger argue that Pollock was “so
wrong and contrary to national interests that it directly inspired a constitutional amendment.”68
They contend further that the “erosion of Pollock through a combination of Supreme Court
decisions and the Sixteenth Amendment” constitutes the only reason that the Supreme Court has
not overruled it (yet).69 Similarly, Professor Johnson argues that Pollock must be overruled,
because the majority “used apportionment as a convenient excuse to kill a federal tax that the
Justices disliked for political reasons.”70
On the other extreme of the spectrum, Professor Erik Jensen argues that the Constitution
does not grant Congress plenary power in taxation, and that certain national consumption taxes
would be unconstitutional.71 In supporting a broad interpretation of the Direct Tax Clause, as a
check on oppressive government, Professor Jensen contends that Pollock was correctly decided,
whereas Hylton is “inherently flawed, largely because the Justices relied excessively on the
imaginative, but misleading, arguments of Alexander Hamilton.”72 Other scholars have expressed
similar doubts about the constitutionality of the wealth tax, whether it is framed as a plain tax on
wealth or as an income tax on a base equal to the risk-free return on assets.73
65 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW 111 (2016) (“When a general policy is qualified by
an exception or proviso, courts ‘usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the
policy.’” (quoting Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1989))).
66 Ackerman, supra note 36, at 6, 28-33.
67 Id. at 3 (“[M]odern-day reformers should be focusing on a single objective—to convince the American
People of the twenty-first century of the justice of their cause.”); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
68 Johnsen & Dellinger, supra note 20, at 135.
69 Id. at 130.
70 Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Taxes, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 295, 298 (2004); accord Calvin H. Johnson, Purging out Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal Wealth or
Sales Taxes, 97 TAXNOTES 1723 (2002).
71 See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2338 (1997).
72 Id. at 2351 (noting in addition that “most commentators assume that Hylton is right and Pollock wrong”).
73 See, e.g., George K. Yin, Accommodating the “Low-Income” in a Cash-Flow or Consumed Income Tax
World, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 445, 464-65 (1995) (discussing how certain models for progressive wealth taxation, such as one
imposed periodically rather than on transfers, are “of questionable constitutional validity in the absence of state
apportionment”). Compare Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax as a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 442 (2000)
(“[T]he demonstration of economic equivalence [between a wealth tax and an income tax on risk-free returns to certain
assets] might well persuade the Court to uphold the wealth tax on the basis that, in substance and labels aside, in fact, it is
a tax on income within the Sixteenth Amendment and not a direct tax.”) with Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty
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My approach here contributes to existing scholarship in two ways. First, by focusing on
the Pollock majority’s interpretation of the Direct Tax Clause as a federalism provision, it
challenges traditional assumptions and argues that the underlying rationale, at least, of Pollock can
be reconciled with the functional rule of Hylton. Second, by providing an empirical analysis of
how a wealth tax would be apportioned, the Article argues that neither the rationale of Pollock nor
the rule of Hylton justifies characterizing the wealth tax as a direct tax.
III. APPORTIONING THE WEALTH TAX
The Constitution instructs that direct taxes be laid “in Proportion to the Census,”74 i.e., in
proportion to the population counted by the U.S. Census by state. This Part of the Article
examines how the wealth tax would be apportioned in accordance with the Constitution and
discusses the federalism concerns that arise from apportionment.
A. Methodology
A methodological note first: accurate data on the geographic distribution of wealth are
difficult to obtain. The best data on the wealth and net worth of U.S. households may be found in
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a comprehensive, triennial study of the financial
conditions of over 6,000 families maintained by the Federal Reserve.75 Unfortunately, “due to
strict disclosure agreements,” SCF does not disclose any geographic data (e.g., the state of
residence of the surveyed families).76 The second-best data come from the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), which publishes both estate-tax and personal-wealth data.77 Again, because
“thinness of the data creates large disclosure concerns in many states with smaller populations,”
the IRS does not publish estate-tax or personal-wealth data that are divided up by state and by
sizes of the estate or net worth.78 Instead, the only data available by state are the numbers and the
wealth of households with net worth above $5 million.79
Although the IRS personal-wealth data are not perfect for assessing the geographic
distribution of wealth across the United States, they are sufficient for the purposes of this Article
in America: A Tale of Two Literatures, 68 TAX L. REV. 453, 491 (2015) (explaining that, in order for an income tax to
mimic the wealth tax perfectly, it must be “determined solely by applying the tax rate to one’s wealth at the relevant
moment” and therefore “face the same constitutional challenge as a straightforwardly labeled property tax”).
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
75 See Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm [https://perma.cc/K2MP-TM2W].
76 Email from SCF Staff, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Alex Zhang (Nov. 20,
2019, 06:30 EST) (on file with author).
77 See SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-
tax-stats-estate-tax-statistics [https://perma.cc/RG2L-XLKW] (indicating that the IRS publishes data on estate tax
statistics); SOI Tax Stats—Personal Wealth Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-
stats-personal-wealth-statistics [https://perma.cc/S2ZE-YA8H] (indicating that the IRS publishes data on personal wealth
statistics).
78 Email from David Jordan, Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, to Alex Zhang (Nov.
25, 2019, 13:45 EST) (on file with author).
79 I have attached the spreadsheet at the end of the Article. See infra appendix I (containing such data).
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for three reasons. First, in order to examine how a wealth tax would be apportioned among the
states, I need not the exact amount of wealth possessed by taxpayers within each state (expressed
in absolute numbers), but only the relative percentage of wealth distribution across the states. That
is, assessing exactly how unequally a wealth tax would be apportioned does not need the type of
data necessary for calculating the revenue estimates of the wealth tax. As a result, while the IRS
personal-wealth statistics are based on amounts reported on estate tax returns, they should reflect
at least the comparative distribution of wealth across the states, as long as we assume that the tax-
evading ability of, e.g., the ultra-rich in Delaware is roughly equivalent to the tax-evading ability
of, e.g., the ultra-rich in Arizona. Since the personal-wealth data are compiled from estate tax
returns, they automatically take into account the type of techniques—whether they are valuation
irregularities, creation of corporate or trust entities to shield wealth from taxation, or offshoring—
that rich taxpayers would surely utilize to evade the wealth tax.
Second, it is certainly true that wealth distribution of households with net worth above $5
million does not perfectly mirror the wealth distribution of households with net worth above $50
million (the starting point at which Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax would be assessed).80 But if
anything, wealth held by households with net worth above $50 million would be even more
unevenly distributed than wealth held by households with net worth above $5 million: New York,
for example, would likely have a much larger percentage of the ultra-rich than West Virginia,
compared with the relative percentages of the rich.
Lastly, the IRS data do not account for the possibility of estate tax evasion on the state
level. That is, wealthy New Yorkers (or residents of any high-tax jurisdiction) might report their
residence in Florida (or any low-tax jurisdiction). However, the result of this evasion would shift
wealth out of wealthy states and toward less wealthy states in the IRS data, implying an even
larger actual imbalance of wealth distribution in the United States. Therefore, an accurate
apportionment of the wealth tax, assessed at $50 million, would create even more inequality and
injustice, bolstering the main argument of this Article.
B. Apportionment
Based on the IRS personal-wealth data for 201381 and the 2013 census estimates of state
population,82 and assuming a 2% wealth tax rate for D.C., which has the highest per capita wealth
held by households with net worth above $5 million,83 the table below lists the wealth tax rate as
apportioned among the states. The states are ordered from the richest jurisdiction, with the lowest
wealth tax rate (D.C.; 2%), to the poorest jurisdiction, with the highest wealth tax rate (West
Virginia; 40.027%).
80 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (indicating that Senator Warren’s wealth tax plan starts with
household net worth above $50 million).
81 Infra Appendix I. The 2013 data set is the most recent from the IRS; Email from David Jordan, IRS SOI,
to Alex Zhang, supra note 78.
82 State Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 22, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-state-total.html [https://perma.cc/545Y-NHPP].
83 I.e., suppose that the amount of wealth, held by households with net worth > $5 million and as measured
by the IRS, is expressed as A/W, and suppose that the census population is expressed as P. Then D.C., the richest
jurisdiction, would have the highest A/W divided by P, and West Virginia, the poorest jurisdiction, would have the lowest
A/W divided by P.
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(…continues on next page)
Table 1: Wealth Tax Apportionment
State of residence







D.C. = 2%)Number Wealth(in millions)
District of
Columbia 4,993 46,716 650,431 2.000
Connecticut 12,316 207,003 3,594,915 2.495
Montana 1,073 45,527 1,013,564 3.198
Vermont 2,287 26,514 626,212 3.393
Wyoming 1,412 21,746 582,123 3.845
New York 53,038 712,276 19,628,043 3.958
Nebraska 3,299 59,527 1,865,414 4.501
Florida 36,703 617,817 19,563,166 4.549
North Dakota 2,877 22,144 721,999 4.684
California 78,413 1,123,895 38,280,824 4.893
Nevada 3,383 78,822 2,776,972 5.061
Maine 4,335 37,156 1,328,196 5.135
Minnesota 11,323 145,541 5,413,693 5.343
Alaska 2,648 19,056 737,045 5.556
Iowa 4,448 75,025 3,093,078 5.922
Massachusetts 12,383 158,892 6,713,944 6.070
New Jersey 13,957 200,859 8,858,362 6.335
Kansas 5,643 61,054 2,893,510 6.808
Oklahoma 9,960 80,432 3,853,205 6.882
Rhode Island 2,322 21,151 1,055,122 7.166
Texas 41,736 530,581 26,489,464 7.172
Maryland 7,792 118,316 5,923,704 7.192
South Carolina 7,889 91,076 4,764,153 7.514
Missouri 3,899 113,689 6,040,658 7.632
Illinois 17,597 240,630 12,898,269 7.700
Washington 10,303 128,356 6,962,906 7.792
Colorado 4,962 92,484 5,270,482 8.186
Idaho 2,660 28,187 1,611,530 8.213
South Dakota 1,165 14,388 842,270 8.409
Virginia 11,208 137,868 8,253,053 8.599
New Mexico 4,763 34,411 2,092,792 8.736
New Hampshire 1,684 20,798 1,326,408 9.161
Pennsylvania 13,428 194,665 12,776,621 9.428
Kentucky 3,288 55,828 4,404,817 11.334
Alabama 4,115 55,864 4,830,460 12.421
North Carolina 11,931 113,321 9,843,599 12.478
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Wisconsin 4,722 63,550 5,736,952 12.968
Mississippi 2,340 32,678 2,988,797 13.138
Georgia 10,149 108,776 9,973,326 13.170
Indiana 5,416 66,877 6,568,367 14.108
Ohio 10,861 116,394 11,576,576 14.287
Michigan 8,535 98,191 9,913,349 14.503
Arizona 5,345 65,383 6,634,999 14.577
Utah 1,701 27,181 2,897,927 15.315
Hawaii 826 13,066 1,408,453 15.484
Louisiana 3,611 40,627 4,624,577 16.351
Oregon 3,115 33,312 3,922,908 16.916
Tennessee 4,716 48,567 6,493,432 19.206
Arkansas 1,342 19,783 2,959,549 21.490
Delaware 350 3,571 923,638 37.154
West Virginia 613 6,653 1,853,873 40.027
As Table 1 shows, apportioning the wealth tax would create precisely the kind of “great
inequality and injustice” that Hylton prohibits.84 Recall that Justice Chase in Hylton illustrates the
meaning of “great inequality and injustice” by example of an apportionment that would result in
taxpayers in one state paying ten times as much tax per carriage than taxpayers in another state.85
Apportioning the wealth would result in even greater inequality and injustice: while residents of
D.C. would pay a 2% tax on their net worth, residents of West Virginia would have to pay a 40%
tax on their net worth, i.e., twenty times as much tax as D.C. taxpayers. If a 10 difference is
sufficient to characterize a tax as an indirect tax, a fortiori, a 20 difference in tax rate on a tax
base that is much more all-inclusive than a carriage tax suffices to characterize the wealth tax as
indirect. Overall, apportionment would subject 18 states to tax rates that are at least five times as
much as the tax rate in the richest jurisdiction. Even disregarding D.C., which technically is not a
state, West Virginia taxpayers would encounter a tax burden that is sixteen times as much as
Connecticut taxpayers. Therefore, under Hylton’s functional rule, the wealth tax should not be
regarded as a direct tax.
A second insight that we may draw from Table 1 is that apportionment of the wealth tax
creates such disparate tax rates that would dramatically impair, if not completely destroy, the
ability of state and local governments to tax—a result contrary to the Pollock majority’s reading
of the Direct Tax Clause as a provision of federalism. Recall that the Pollock Court explained that
the purpose of the Direct Tax Clause was to preserve the capacity of several states to tax
concurrently with the federal government.86 Imposing an annual, 40% (or even 15% or 20%) tax
on more or less the entirety of the assets of households (even of ultra-rich households) would
surely destroy the ability of the states to impose any additional tax on top of it.87 This is especially
84 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174.
85 Id.
86 See supra Part I (demonstrating that the Pollock Court held the Direct Tax Clause had such a purpose).
87 In fact, a wealth tax at such a high rate, combined with the income tax, would make federal taxation
alone in these poor jurisdictions reach almost confiscatory levels.
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the case considering the TCJA’s limitation of the deduction for state and local taxes to $10,000.88
If the Supreme Court were to adopt Pollock’s reading of the Direct Tax Clause as a provision of
federalism, holding the wealth tax as a direct tax that must be apportioned among the states would
run counter to the very purpose of the clause. Apportionment would practically eliminate state and
local taxation as we know it, instead of enabling it. It would also create huge incentives for capital
to flow from poor (high-tax) to rich (low-tax) states, further exacerbating the uneven geographic
distribution of wealth. For a Supreme Court that is highly attentive to issues of federalism,89
apportionment of the wealth tax leads to a disastrous result.
A more careful look at Table 1 reveals an additional fact: apportioning the wealth tax
would harm, most of all, the Southern states that, according to Justice Paterson in Hylton, the
Direct Tax Clause was meant to protect.90 If the original meaning—conceived at a very high level
of specificity—was to prevent the enactment of facially neutral tax regimes that disparately
impact the Southern states with less productive land and other resources, then apportionment of
the wealth tax would fall directly into what the Direct Tax Clause was intended to prohibit.
Among the 25 states with the highest apportioned wealth tax rates, 10 are in the South, including
West Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Alabama,
Kentucky, and Virginia. These represent the vast majority of the Southern states, and
apportionment of the wealth tax under the Direct Tax Clause—which was originally inserted into
the Constitution to protect them from unfair federal taxation—would impair their ability to tax
most of all. The current Supreme Court has espoused originalism—at least a specific form of
originalism—as an interpretive methodology91 and thus ought to take into account the originalist
argument against apportionment.92
88 § 11042, 131 Stat. at 2085 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164).
89 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS 441, 441 (2016) (“Federalism has
been a central focus of some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most important and controversial decisions since John Roberts
became Chief Justice in 2005.”).
90 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (indicating that Hylton intended to protect Southern states). It
would be somewhat ironic if the 2017 tax act’s limit on state and local tax (SALT) deduction ends up harming the states
that would bear a heavy federal tax burden under an apportioned national wealth tax. The $10,000 SALT cap was wide
perceived as an attempt by the Trump administration to punish Democratic states that supported Hilary Clinton during the
2016 presidential election. See, e.g., Alicia Parlapiano & K.K. Rebecca Lai, Among the Tax Bill’s Biggest Losers: High-
Income, Blue State Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/05/
us/politics/tax-bill-salt.html [https://perma.cc/M5T9-XPPZ] (identifying a correlation between the states hit hardest by the
2017 tax bill and those that most strongly supported Hillary Clinton in 2016); Carolyn Y. Johnson et al., Blue States Will
Be Hit Hardest by GOP Tax Plan’s Limits on Deductions, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2017/11/02/the-gop-tax-plan-limits-deductions-used-in-blue-states [https://perma.cc/K48V-H4RG]
(providing additional support for the suggestion that predominantly-Democratic states were hit hardest by the 2017 tax
bill). Under an apportioned national wealth tax, taxpayers in traditionally low-state-and-local-tax jurisdictions are likely to
face heavy federal tax burdens when they cannot deduct more than $10,000 of state and local taxes that would fund local
expenditures.
91 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 412, 423
n.37 (providing an additional argument that originalism may exert a “gravitational pull” or influence on non-originalist
jurists).
92 See also Ackerman, supra note 15 (“If the Roberts court were to hold true to its purported originalist
principles, it would have to uphold a wealth tax.”).
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C. Apportionment and Federalism
Scholarly conceptions of federalism have shifted dramatically in the past few decades.93
Partly motivated by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ emphases on federalism in constitutional
adjudications,94 and partly responding to the demise of the sovereignty model,95 scholars have
innovatively theorized the relationship between states and the federal government in the post-
New-Deal and post-Civil-Rights-Movement era. This section situates the main issue addressed by
the Article—the state-by-state apportionment of a wealth tax—within the federalism literature,
arguing that the results of apportionment not only destabilize our system of federalism but also
impair the states’ abilities to carry out federal regulations and initiatives.
The traditional notion of federalism attributes sovereignty to both state and the federal
governments: within its own (separate and exclusive) sphere of regulation, each government
possesses plenary power without interference.96 Under the framework of dual and sovereignty-
based federalism, which is outdated but still occasionally invoked by the Court, the apportionment
of a national wealth tax leads to disastrous results. First, although the precise contours of
sovereignty as a concept of political control and authority remain murky, it is generally accepted
that the ability to tax and to determine tax policy is central to sovereignty.97 Tax policy is an
instrument through which governments effectuate many of their substantive economic goals and
execute welfare programs (e.g., the Earned Income Tax Credit). Severe restrictions on a state’s
ability to shape its domestic tax policy, coupled with a substantial reduction in its taxing power,
thereby represent a concrete threat to the governmental entity’s sovereignty. Second, if we take
seriously the idea that state and local governments are authoritative over certain spheres of
93 See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695 (2017) (surveying the past
two generations of federalism literature and proposing a research agenda for federalism scholars in the twenty-first
century).
94 See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & JOHN C. BLAKEMAN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND NEW FEDERALISM:
FROM THE REHNQUIST TO THE ROBERTS COURT (2012) (indicating that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts heavily relied on
federalism concerns in their constitutional adjudications); Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist
Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (providing additional support for this heavy focus on
federalism by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX L.
REV. 1 (2004).
95 See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950); see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427 (1987) (“[I]deas that true sovereignty in our
system lies only in the People of the United States, and that all governments are thus necessarily limited . . . pervade the
Constitution and inform its structure of federalism.”).
96 See Corwin, supra note 95, at 4 (1950) (“Within their respective spheres the two centers of government
are ‘sovereign’ and hence ‘equal.’”); see also Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 12 (2010) (“Sovereignty—which formally guarantees a state’s power to rule without interference over a
policymaking domain of its own—has sometimes been invoked as federalism’s definitional limit.”).
97 See Tracey A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations on State Tax Sovereignty, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 149 (1998) (“One of the core elements of sovereignty reserved to the states under the Constitution
is the power of a state to define its own tax system.”); see also Diane Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition:
The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555, 559 (2009) (“[O]ne important ‘right’ of
the sovereign state—tax sovereignty—carries meaningful content. The ability to control tax policy enables a state to meet
its functional duties (revenue raising and fiscal policy design) and support its two important democratic norms—
democratic accountability and democratic legitimacy.”).
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regulation (e.g., education and municipal services)—or even the much softer, process-federalism
suggestion of “preserv[ing] the regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate
policy choices”98—apportioning the wealth tax deprives the state and local governments of any
fiscal resource to implement their policy preferences. In short, whether we think of sovereignty as
depending on separate spheres of regulation or on states’ autonomy, it is impossible to govern
without the ability to tax—a lesson that the national government learned well from the Articles of
Confederation.
The dual sovereignty theory of federalism has fallen out of favor in the academy,99 even
if some scholars maintain that newer conceptions still reflect a troubling persistence of the
sovereignty assumption.100 Due to federalization—the process through which the federal
government moves into domains traditionally regulated by states—recent federalism literature
increasingly emphasizes the significant roles played by the states in federal regulatory regimes.101
State and local agencies and institutions, for example, play central roles in implementing the
health care reforms of the Affordable Care Act,102 constitute an indispensable instrument in the
regulation of immigration,103 and even shape policies in national security and counter-terrorism,104
which are areas traditionally thought to belong exclusively to the federal government. If the state
governments lose their ability to tax and their (relative) fiscal independence, they will cease to
fulfill their duties (and use their powers) as “servants” to the federal government.105
98 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 215, 222 (2000).
99 See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after
Garcia, 8 SUP. CT. REV. 346, 346 (1985) (“The rhetoric of state sovereignty is responsible for much of the intellectual
poverty of our federalism-related jurisprudence.”); see also Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual
Federalism, 55 NOMOS 34, 36 (2014) (“Dual federalism died in the middle of the twentieth century because the Court
found itself unable to draw determinate lines to define the exclusive sphere of state authority into which national power
might not enter.”).
100 See Gerken, supra note 93, at 1698 (“The scholarly response to the death of sovereignty has been either
to move to the nationalist camp, all but erasing the states from constitutional discourse, or to pivot from a sovereignty
account of state power to an autonomy account. Ironically, both positions reveal the persistence of the old sovereignty
story.”).
101 See id. at 1700-02 (asserting various domains that states assert power informally within the federal
regulatory schemes regulating traditionally state domains).
102 See Abbe Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 539-40 (2011) (highlighting the Affordable Care Act’s
requirement that states establish health insurance exchanges).
103 See Cristina Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV.
567, 571 (2008) (“[T]he federal government, the states, and localities form part of an integrated regulatory structure that
helps the country as a whole to absorb immigration flows and manage the social and cultural change that immigration
inevitably engenders.”).
104 See Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289
(2012) (describing the various ways that state statutes, state constitutional doctrines, municipal legislation and regulations,
judicial consent decrees, and state and local administrative guidelines are used to shape and implement federal national
security and counter-terrorism efforts).
105 Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (2006).
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CONCLUSION: HOW TO DRAFT THE WEALTH TAX
This Article argues that both the functional rule of Hylton and the underlying rationale of
Pollock disfavor classifying the wealth tax as a direct tax. Under the former, apportionment would
create great inequality and injustice; under the latter, apportionment would impair the taxing
powers of some of the poorest states in the nation. Although I arrive at this conclusion from a
different path, debates about wealth taxation—as Professor Ackerman argues—should be resolved
on the merits, i.e., in accordance with a democratic deliberation about its potential to further ideals
of social and distributive justice.106
As this Article goes to print, Joe Biden has emerged as the 2020 Democratic presidential
nominee. But calls for a progressive wealth have not ceased. The novel coronavirus is currently
ravaging the world, and there is preliminary evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic has
disparately impacted poorer communities107—who cannot afford to stay at home and engage in
social distancing—and will exacerbate existing inequality.108 As a result, prominent scholars, such
as Professor Daniel Markovits, have advocated imposing a one-time assessment of a 5% wealth
tax in order to fund the federal government’s coronavirus relief efforts.109 The wealth tax has
captured the liberal imagination for the past few decades—for good reasons—and as long as
economic inequality remains a defining social issue of our time, a progressive wealth tax will
continue to be a staple of political debate.
In addition, both the doctrinal and the apportionment analyses developed here provide
policy suggestions about how the wealth tax should be drafted.110 By focusing on apportionment
and issues of federalism, I hope to change the framing of the current debate: the relevant question
is not whether a wealth tax would be constitutional or would be held constitutional by the current
Supreme Court; rather, the question is whether a wealth tax needs or should be apportioned in
order to pass constitutional muster. Therefore, in drafting the wealth tax legislation, Congress
should consider adding a clause that provides for a constitutional apportionment among the states,
should the wealth tax be judicially characterized as a direct tax. In other words, if a federal court
adopts such a broad view of the Direct Tax Clause as to subsume the wealth tax under it, the court
106 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
107 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Location Data Says It All: Staying at Home During Coronavirus
Is a Luxury, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/03/us/coronavirus-stay-home-rich-
poor.html [https://perma.cc/A8Z7-8BXR].
108 See Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens Its Spread,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirus-inequality.html
[https://perma.cc/K73V-KCJ5].
109 See Daniel Markovits, A Wealth Tax Is the Logical Way to Support Coronavirus Relief, N.Y TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/opinion/coronavirus-wealth-tax.html [https://perma.cc/2PG8-
ZFXG].
110 Cf. John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal for a Constitutionally Apportioned Wealth
Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 514-15 (proposing that the federal government should collect a wealth tax at a
uniform rate and return the excess unapportioned share of the tax revenue to the states of origin via a pick-up tax
mechanism, in order to satisfy the Direct Tax Clause). Although Professor Plecnik’s pick-up tax mechanism may resolve
the constitutional difficulty, the highly uneven distribution of wealth (and the apportionment schedule, see supra tbl.1)
means that the pick-up mechanism will result in very little federal revenues from the wealth tax (and a large pick-up tax
revenue to the wealthy states). The main point of enacting a wealth tax, after all, is to pay for ambitious federal social-
welfare programs, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, not to enrich the treasuries of certain state governments.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss4/1
2020] THEWEALTH TAX 289
will also have to impose an apportionment schedule—an unjust and inequitable one—on the
taxpayers. The apportionment clause of a wealth tax legislation forces the federal judiciary to
confront the uneasy political consequences of its own Direct-Tax-Clause jurisprudence: will
judges impose substantive injustice—which surely results from apportionment111—as a cost of
constitutionality?112
111 See supra tbl.1.
112 Of course, a federal court may also declare that the apportionment of the wealth tax itself violates the
federalism provisions of the Constitution, in addition to invalidating an unapportioned wealth tax. But such a scenario
would be unprecedented, and today’s federal courts are not generally inclined to (and certainly not equipped to) reach tax-
policy judgments of national significance. The recent litigation concerning the 2017 tax act’s limit on SALT deductions is
instructive. In July 2018, New York, Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey filed lawsuit in federal court, arguing that
TCJA’s $10,000 cap on SALT deductions violated the Tenth Amendment and exceeded Congress’s taxing power.
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, New York v. Mnuchin, 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 WL 4805709 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). The
federal district court quickly granted the federal government’s motion to dismiss the four states’ constitutional challenge.
In dismissing the lawsuit, the court held that the TCJA cap does not violate the Tenth Amendment, since the states “remain
free to exercise their tax power however they wish,” and the lone fact that a legislation “affects the decisional landscape
within which states must choose how to exercise their own sovereign authority” does not “render[] the law an
unconstitutional infringement of state power.” New York v. Mnuchin, 2019 WL 4805709, at *15 (quoting United States v.
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 82, 103 (1983)).
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APPENDICES
Appendix I: High Net Worth Households by State 113
State of residence
Net worth
(Household net worth > $5 million)































New Hampshire 1,684 20,798
(…continues on next page)
113 Amounts are in millions of dollars. Aaron Barnes, Personal Wealth, 2013, at 22 tbl.6, STAT. OF INCOME,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-inpw-id1902.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2AZ-F3L2].
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New Jersey 13,957 200,859
New Mexico 4,763 34,411
New York 53,038 712,276
North Carolina 11,931 113,321





Rhode Island 2,322 21,151
South Carolina 7,889 91,076







West Virginia 613 6,653
Wisconsin 4,722 63,550
Wyoming 1,412 21,746
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Alabama 4,115 55,864 4,830,460 12.421
Alaska 2,648 19,056 737,045 5.556
Arizona 5,345 65,383 6,634,999 14.577
Arkansas 1,342 19,783 2,959,549 21.490
California 78,413 1,123,895 38,280,824 4.893
Colorado 4,962 92,484 5,270,482 8.186
Connecticut 12,316 207,003 3,594,915 2.495
Delaware 350 3,571 923,638 37.154
District of Columbia 4,993 46,716 650,431 2.000
Florida 36,703 617,817 19,563,166 4.549
Georgia 10,149 108,776 9,973,326 13.170
Hawaii 826 13,066 1,408,453 15.484
Idaho 2,660 28,187 1,611,530 8.213
Illinois 17,597 240,630 12,898,269 7.700
Indiana 5,416 66,877 6,568,367 14.108
Iowa 4,448 75,025 3,093,078 5.922
Kansas 5,643 61,054 2,893,510 6.808
Kentucky 3,288 55,828 4,404,817 11.334
Louisiana 3,611 40,627 4,624,577 16.351
Maine 4,335 37,156 1,328,196 5.135
Maryland 7,792 118,316 5,923,704 7.192
Massachusetts 12,383 158,892 6,713,944 6.070
Michigan 8,535 98,191 9,913,349 14.503
Minnesota 11,323 145,541 5,413,693 5.343
114 In order to arrive at the wealth tax rate, we can first calculate the a comparative ratio between the state’s
(or locality’s) share of overall population and the state’s (or locality’s) share of over-threshold wealth. We can then
normalize this ratio, on the basis of, for example, a base 2% tax in D.C., to arrive at the tax rates for all states and
localities.
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Mississippi 2,340 32,678 2,988,797 13.138
Missouri 3,899 113,689 6,040,658 7.632
Montana 1,073 45,527 1,013,564 3.198
Nebraska 3,299 59,527 1,865,414 4.501
Nevada 3,383 78,822 2,776,972 5.061
New Hampshire 1,684 20,798 1,326,408 9.161
New Jersey 13,957 200,859 8,858,362 6.335
New Mexico 4,763 34,411 2,092,792 8.736
New York 53,038 712,276 19,628,043 3.958
North Carolina 11,931 113,321 9,843,599 12.478
North Dakota 2,877 22,144 721,999 4.684
Ohio 10,861 116,394 11,576,576 14.287
Oklahoma 9,960 80,432 3,853,205 6.882
Oregon 3,115 33,312 3,922,908 16.916
Pennsylvania 13,428 194,665 12,776,621 9.428
Rhode Island 2,322 21,151 1,055,122 7.166
South Carolina 7,889 91,076 4,764,153 7.514
South Dakota 1,165 14,388 842,270 8.409
Tennessee 4,716 48,567 6,493,432 19.206
Texas 41,736 530,581 26,489,464 7.172
Utah 1,701 27,181 2,897,927 15.315
Vermont 2,287 26,514 626,212 3.393
Virginia 11,208 137,868 8,253,053 8.599
Washington 10,303 128,356 6,962,906 7.792
West Virginia 613 6,653 1,853,873 40.027
Wisconsin 4,722 63,550 5,736,952 12.968
Wyoming 1,412 21,746 582,123 3.845
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